


MoME: Mixture-of-Masked-Experts for Efficient Multi-Task Recommendation (SIGIR'24)

Motivation: deep neural network suffer from:

- **High** computational consumption
- **Poor** scaling-up ability

Our solution -- MoME

1. **Mixture of Experts (MoE):** Activate a subset of parameters (experts) for each input
2. One overparameterized base network and a mixture of binary masks!





Better performance with significantly reduced model size.

Parameter Matching Attack: Enhancing Practical Applicability of Availability Attacks (CSS'24 symposium best paper award)

Motivation:

data owners want their data to be used by **humans** and not by **ML model**.



High-level idea:

- Optimize the perturbation so that the **resulting model performs similarly to a low-performance model**.
- Resulting model is trained on a mixture of **perturbed dataset and clean dataset**.

Results:

Show better results than previous methods when poison ratio is smaller than 100%

Members 2024

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
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Trojan attribute inference attack on gradient boosting decision trees (IEEE Euro S&P'24)


Motivation:

- Attribute Inference attack (AIA) has been investigated for DNN intensively, but not for boosting trees
- Establish AIA for boosting trees in federated learning setting



Key Idea:

Insert a trojan tree that cause attribute leakage



Results:

Our AIA always predicts the ground-truth att. value

Theorem 1. Fix n_{max} and r_{max} . For $c = 1, \dots, C$, define w_c and $(\tilde{w}_{c,min}, \tilde{w}_{c,max})$ as (5) and (6). Suppose that $f_{v \in D}$ is trained after the next round that f_{Trojan} generated by MakeTrojan with the width ϵ , is trained. Suppose the following conditions hold:
 (A) for all $z \in D^{(v \in D)} \setminus \{z^*\}$, there exists $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ such that $\|x_t(z) - x_t(z^*)\| \geq \epsilon$;
 (B) $|D_{L^*}| \leq n_{max}$; and,
 (C) for all $z \in D^{(v \in D)} \setminus \{z^*\}$, $|r_{k+1}(z)| \leq r_{max}$.
 Then, the output of Infer (Algorithm 5) coincides with the ground-truth value of the target attribute.

	HSKC		Census	
	Basic	SimFL	Basic	SimFL
Predict Most Common	0.53	0.51	0.56	0.59
Whitebox AIA [17]	0.53	0.51	0.56	0.59
Imputation [27]	0.78	0.74	0.75	0.80
Trojan AIA (Ours)	0.99	0.99	0.89	0.80

Model Merging Disruption via Weight Dispatching (on going)

Motivation:



- Privacy issue in model merging

Proposed method

- Transfer weight basin
- Equivalent transformation for consistent performance

Results:

- Model merging disrupted from A to B



Achievement in 2024

Journals:

- Transactions on Machine Learning Research 1
- Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 1
- International Journal of Information Security 2
- Information Geometry 1
- ACM Transactions on Evolutionary Learning and Optimization 1
- Evolutionary Computation 1他

Conference papers:

- NeurIPS'24 2
- AISTAS'24 1
- Euro S&P 2024 2
- IEEE BigData 1
- GECCO '24 1
- ASIACCS 2024 1 他