November 20, 2018 19:03

Abstract

Speaker: Prof. Makoto Yokoo (Kyushu University)

Title: Mechanism Design for Constrained Matching

Abstract:
The theory of two-sided matching (e.g., assigning residents to
hospitals, students to schools) has been extensively developed, and it
has been applied to design clearinghouse mechanisms in various markets
in practice. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse
types of environments, however, researchers and practitioners have
encountered various forms of distributional constraints. As these
features have been precluded from consideration until recently, they
pose new challenges for market designers. One example of such
distributional constraints is a minimum quota, e.g., school districts
may need at least a certain number of students in each school in order
for the school to operate. In this talk, I present an overview of
research on designing mechanisms that work under distributional
constraints.

Biography:
Makoto Yokoo http://agent.inf.kyushu-u.ac.jp/~yokoo received the
B.E., M.E., and Ph.D. degrees in 1984, 1986, and 1995, respectively,
form the University of Tokyo, Japan. He is currently a Distinguished
Professor of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu
University, Japan. He served as a general co-chair of International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems in 2007
(AAMAS-2007), and as a program co-chair of AAMAS-2003. He is the past
president of International Foundation for Autonomous Agent and
Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), which is a hosting organization of AAMAS
conference series. He is a fellow of the Association for Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). He received the ACM SIGART
Autonomous Agents Research Award in 2004, and the IFAAMAS influential
paper award in 2010.

More Information

Date November 28, 2018 (Wed) 13:00 - 14:30
URL https://c5dc59ed978213830355fc8978.doorkeeper.jp/events/83390

Venue

〒103-0027 Nihonbashi 1-chome Mitsui Building, 15th floor, 1-4-1 Nihonbashi,Chuo-ku, Tokyo